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marked as ergative in appropriate contexts, with a concomitant shift in the position of the 
ergative split. 
Thulung and the other Tibeto-Burman languages of Nepal  are in  an intense contact 
situation with Indo-Aryan Nepali, as we saw in this case, with Nepali creating the press ure 
for a shift in the pronoun system which then has consequences in other areas, such as case 
marking.  It is interesting to speculate on further contact-induced changes in Thulung, as 
the  number of fluent  speakers  dwindles  and Nepali  makes  further  inroads  into  the 
language. 
References 
Allen,  Nicholas J.,  1975,  Sketch 0/ Thulung  grammar.  Cornell University East Asia 
Papers NO.6.  Ithaca:  Comell University. 
Bickel, Balthasar and Johanna Nichols, 2001, Inflectional morphology.  Unpublished ms., 
U.C.  Berkeley 
Comrie, Bemard, 1981, Language universals and linguistic typology.  Chicago:  University 
of Chicago Press.  (2nd edition 1989.  Oxford:  Basil Blackwell.) 
Dixon, Robert Malcolm Ward, 1994, Ergativity.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 
Dryer, Matthew S.,  1986, Primary objects, secondary objects, and antidative.  Language 
62/4:808-845. 
Ebert,  Karen,  1994,  The  structure 0/ Kiranti languages.  Arbeiten  des  Seminars  für 
Allgemeine  Sprachwissenschaft, 13.  Zürich:  Universität Zürich. 
LaPolla, Randy,  1992,  'Anti-ergative'  marking in  Tibeto-Burman.  Linguistics 0/ the 
Tibeto-Burman Area 15/1: 1-9 
1994, Parallel grammaticalizations in Tibeto-Burman languages:  evidence of Sapir's 
'Drift'.  Linguistics 0/ the Tibeto-Burman Area 17/1 :61-78. 
Matisoff, James A, 1991, Universal and areal dimensions of grammaticalization in Lahu. 
In Elizabeth Traugott and Bemd Heine eds Approaches to grammaticalization, vol.2, 
383-453.  Amsterdam:  John Benjamins. 
Matthews, David, 1998, A course in Nepali.  Richmond, Surrey:  Curzon Press. 
)ilverstein, Michael, 1976, Hierarchy of features and ergativity.  In Robert Malcolm Ward 
Dixon  ed. Grammatical categories  in Australian languages, 112-71.  Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies. 
8  Why languages differ:  variation 
in the conventionalisation of 
constraints on inference* 
RANDY J.  LAPOLLA 
Language is the frail bridge that we fling across the chasm of the inexpressible and the 
incommunicable. 
Matisoff 1979[2000]:2 
1 Introduction 
Sperber  and  Wilson  (1996)  and  Wilson  and  Sperber  (1993)  have  argued  that 
communication involves two processes, ostension and inference,  but they  also  assume 
there is  a coding-decoding stage of communication and a functional distinction between 
lexical  items  and  grammatical marking  (what  they  call  'conceptual'  vs.  'procedural' 
information).  Sperber and Wilson have accepted a basically Chomskyan view  of the 
innateness of language structure and Universal Grarnmar.  In this paper I will also assume 
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that communication involves ostension and inference, but propose the hypothesis that there 
is  no innate language  structure,  and no  deterministic coding-decoding process,  as  all 
aspects  of interpretation  involve  inference.  The  inferential  process  involved  in 
communication is the creating of a context in which the ostensive act achieves relevance 
(makes sense).  I also reject the idea of a functional difference between conceptual and 
procedural  information,  and  argue  that the  role  of all  aspects  of language  use  in 
communication is to constrain the inferential process, to  help the addressee construct a 
context in which the communicator's ostensive act can be seen to be relevant.  Contrary to 
most work in  pragmatics  which  assurnes  that context disambiguates  language,  I  am 
proposing  that  it  is  not  context  that  disambiguates  language,  but  language  that 
disambiguates the context of  interpretation.  That is, rather than ass urne that the form of the 
utterance is given and the context is the manipulable variable, we should recognise that in 
real-world communicative situations, speakers have no choice in terms of the context they 
are communicating in, but as  communicators have choices in terms of the form of the 
utterance they  use.  The more expIicit the  Iinguistic form,  the more constrained the 
addressee is in constructing the context of interpretation.  On this view a language and the 
rules for its use in a particular society are a set of social conventions which have evolved in 
the  particular way  they have in that society in response  to  the  need to  constrain  the 
inferential process involved in communication in particular ways thought to be important 
in that society.l  These conventions (or some subset of them)  become habits  of the 
individual speakers of the language.  These conventions and habits are no different in 
nature from other types of conventions and habits that have developed in the society for 
performing particular actions, such as the conventions in the V.S.  of eating with a fork, or 
of men wearing ties on formal occasions, or of driving on the right-hand side of the road. 
As each society develops (evolves) its own particular sets of conventions '(Iinguistic and 
non-linguistic), each set (in totality) is unique to that society and so manifests the way that 
society construes and deals with the world.  That is, the habits and conventions for carrying 
out actions  (including communication) of a  society reflect habits and conventions of 
thought.  The significance of this  view of language  to  typology  is  that  there  is  no 
assumption of a universal genetically-encoded grammar, and each language is  seen as  a 
unique entity reflecting a unique society, and so in doing linguistic work, we must look at 
1  I  am purposefully avoiding use  of the  word  'cuIture', as  it is  a problematic  term  for  many  in  the 
antbropological tradition.  What I am interested in here are the conventionalized methods and tools that a 
society develops for carrying out certain actions.  For example, in a restaurant serving ltalian food in the 
U.S., the table will by convention be set with at least one fork  and a plate, while in a restaurant serving 
Chinese food  in Beijing the table will by convention be set with chopsticks.  Some conventions may be 
written into law, such as driving on the right-hand side of the street in the U.S., to ensure that everyone in 
the society follows the convention, but they are still conventions.  As people follow the conventions on a 
regular basis, they become habits of thought and action, so that not following a particular convention will 
feel and often be considered 'wrong', and will often be difficult to change. 
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each language on its own terms and determine which functional domains it obligatorily 
constrains the interpretation of, to what extent it constrains them (jf it does), and what 
formal mechanisms it uses to constrain the creation of the context of interpretation.  It is in 
these ways that languages differ. 
2  Ostensive-inferential communication 
In human communication, one person (the communicator) does something (an ostensive 
act) with the intention to cause another (the addressee) to become aware of some phatic or 
factual  information.  The  process  by  which  the  addressee  becomes  aware  of the 
information  is  an  inferential  one.  The  hearer  uses  inference  to  recognise  the 
communicative intention of the speaker, and, given the recognition of that intention and the 
particular form  of the  ostensive  act,  the  addressee  can  (usually)  infer the  intended 
information.  The ostensive act can be linguistic, but it need not be communication can 
(and often does) occur without language.
2  What is necessary for communication is not the 
exchange of symbolic expressions, but the successful determination of the reason for the 
communicator making the particular ostensive act that he  or she made.  In terms of a 
linguistic ostensive act,  what is communicated is not what the communicator says, but 
what  the  addressee infers  to  be the intention  behind the  communicator making  that 
particular ostensive act, that is, saying those particular words.  Language is not the basis of 
communication, but simply an instrument used to help the interpreter more easily infer the 
speaker's communicative intention, as it constrains that inferential process by reducing the 
number of assumptions that could potentially be part of the context of interpretation.  Even 
when  the  ostensive  act  is linguistic,  there  are  often  a  great  number of degrees  of 
explicitness possible, depending on the speaker's estimation of the hearer's inferential 
abilities and current knowledge state; the more explicit the utterance, the more constrained 
the interpretation, as in the six different possible answers to the question given in (1) (all of 
which have the same 'meaning'; of these, the first is attested). 
2  Cf.  Keller (1994: 25):  A language facilitates communication, but it is not the condition of its possibility. 
To communicate with the help of conventional instruments such as  linguistic ones is a special kind of 
communication, althougb !bis is for us the normal and prevailing way to communicate.  We are so used to 
it that many  think that the common possession of a stock of signs  together with syntax is  logically 
required (the condition of possibility) in order to communicate at all.  If this  were the case, we  could 
neither meaningfully pose the question of how we as a species acquired language phytogenetically, nor 
how small cbildren can leam their mother tongue ontogenetically.  The reason is that the construction of 
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(1)  Q:  Do you want something to drink? 
Al:  (points to soup bowl) 
A2:  I have soup. 
A3:  No.  I have soup. 
A4:  No, because I have soup. 
AS:  No, since I have soup, I don't need anything to drink. 
A6:  No, I don't want anything to drink.  Since I have soup, I don't need anything 
else to drink right now. 
Al does not constrain the interpretation very much, and so the addressee must (a) infer that 
the communicator is pointing at the soup bowl and not something else, (b) must notice that 
the bowl is full, and (c) must infer that the fullness of the bowl is somehow relevant to the 
communicator's communicative intention, and (d) then infer that the relevance is that soup 
is something to drink, and then (e) infer that since the communicator has something to 
drink,  she might not need something else  to drink,  and then  (f)  conclude  that  the 
communicator's communicative intention in pointing at the soup bowl was to alert the 
addressee to the fact that she does not require anything to drink, as she has soup, and that is 
enough.  A2 constrains the interpretation somewhat more than Al, in that it narrows the 
context of interpretation by explicitly mentioning the soup (thereby eliminating steps (a-c) 
above),  and so the  addressee can then start with the assumption that having soup is 
relevant.  The other inferences (d-f) still must be worked out, though.  A3 constrains the 
context of interpretation even more by supplying the negative answer to the question; A4 
makes explicit the cause and effect relation between the negative answer and the fact of 
having soup.  AS constrains the process of interpretation more than A4, and A6 constrains 
it more than AS.  It is important to notice two things here:  (i) there is no difference in 
communicative function between the linguistic and the non-linguistic responses; (ii) the 
additional  words,  such  as  No in  A3,  and  the  additional  marking of semantic  and 
grammatical relations, such as because in A4, both have the same function, to constrain the 
context of interpretation to a greater degree than not using those words. 
The difference between non-linguistic communication and linguistic communication, or 
brief speech and highly explicit speech, is like the difference between ripping bread into 
pieces with your hands and cutting it carefully with a knife, a difference of tool or mode, 
with resulting differences in precision.  What is important is the separating of the two parts 
of the bread; we should not mistake the tool used (the knife) for the process of separating 
the two parts.  We often communicate with our hands or other body parts, such as pointing 
at the wrist to ask the time, or nodding the head, or wagging the finger with pouted lips to 
show disapproval (there are both conventionalised and non-conventionalised gestures). 
The entire process of interpretation involves  inference,  whether the ostensive act  is 
linguistic or not.  Interpretation of a linguistic ostensive act involves identification of the 
ostensive act as a linguistic act and recovery of its form.  We are not usually conscious of 
this aspect of communication as involving inference, yet psycholinguistic studies (for 
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example, Warren  1970) show that we do  use inference to construct the  form  of the 
utterance we are hearing.  In a multilingual situation, such as where I work in Hong Kong, 
a place where three different languages (Mandarin, Cantonese, and English) are regularly 
used by the same people, and you don't know when they will use which language, the 
inference necessary to determine which language the person is using when they start to talk 
to you often becomes a conscious process. 
Inference is also involved in identifying referents and delirniting the possible intended 
senses of words  and structures, and then there is inference involved in deriving any 
implicatures  that  must  be  created  in  the  processing  of the  resulting  proposition. 
Interpretation then is not simply decoding a signal.  Even interpreting something as code-
like  as  1  +  1  =  2  involves inference of a non-binary number system based on the 
appearance of the number 2 rather than 10.  All linguists would agree that the pragmatic 
aspects  of meaning,  such  as  resolving  ambiguities,  correcting mi  stakes,  identifying 
referents, identifying illocutionary force, recognising irony and humor, and completing 
incomplete utterances, must be interpreted by inference, but I would argue that all aspects 
of interpretation involve inference.  The inference involved in interpretation is essentially 
guesses at  what the communicator's intended message might be.  These guesses  are 
possible because of the unconscious assumption of the principle of relevance, given in (2). 
(2)  The principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1996:260,270): 
1.  Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. 
2.  Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance, such that; 
a.  The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's 
effort to process it. 
b.  The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator's abilities and preferences. 
In  order for the  addressee  to  be  able  to  infer the  communicator's intention,  the 
communicator  must  choose  and  tailor  the  utterance,  in  the  case  of  linguistic 
communication, in such a way that the hearer will not have to expend unnecessary effort to 
create a context that will  allow himlher to  achieve relevance (arrive at the intended 
interpretation).  In doing this, the speaker takes into consideration guesses as  to what 
information is available to the hearer at the time of utterance for use in interpreting the 
utterance.  A speaker must decide what to make explicit and what to make implicit (and 
also, among implicatures, what to make stronger or weaker implicatures), and this is done 
on the basis of the speaker's estimation of the hearer's processing abilities and contextual 
resources, but also partlyon politeness considerations and what we think of as 'style')  The 
An exarnple of the use of a particular utterance form in order 10 convey weak implicatures for the sake of 
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more information that the speaker assurnes the hearer is able to access in the processing of 
an  utterance,  the  less  explicit the  utterance  can  be.  Answer Al in  (1)  above  was 
interpretable in the situation in which it occurred, an interaction between a husband and 
wife at the dinner table, but would not be interpretable in a situation such as an interaction 
between a waiter and a customer in a restaurant.  The wife could assurne the husband could 
assemble a context of interpretation in which such a minimally expHcit ostensive act would 
be relevant, but she could not make such an assumption in deaHng with a waiter; here a 
form which constrains the context to a much greater degree, possibly as much as A5 or A6, 
would be necessary to communicate the same intention. 
The degree to which the hearer is forced to deduce a particular interpretation depends 
on the degree to  which the form of the utterance constrains the hearer in  choosing the 
contextual assumptions necessary to achieve relevance in interpreting the utterance.  In (1) 
we saw that having more words or more grammatical marking in the utterance can more 
greatly constrain the interpretation.  The order of elements that the speaker chooses also 
influences the hearer's interpretation, as  the hearer begins to  assemble the context of 
interpretation as soon as the first word is uttered (or possibly earHer), and this initial set 
will influence the eventual set used for the overall interpretation.  This is true both at the 
clause level and at the phrase level.  Halliday (1994:197), for example, shows how the 
order of elements in the noun phrase in English is related to the degree to  which the 
element helps the hearer identify a particular referent.  In fact all aspects of language can 
be shown to constrain the interpretation, and that is in fact their raison d'etre. 
As mentioned above, work in Relevance Theory, while recognising the importance of 
constraining the context of interpretation, assurnes a distinction between conceptual and 
procedural information (for example, Blakemore 1987, 1988a,b, 1990; Wils~m and Sperber 
1993; Nicolle 1997).  For example, it is argued that one way the speaker can constrain the 
interpretation of impHcature is to use discourse connectives such as so and after alt, which 
are  said  to  contain procedural  information  (procedures  for  manipulating  conceptual 
representations), that is, information on how to interpret the proposition, to alert the hearer 
to the fact that one part of the utterance has a particular relationship to another part of the 
utterance,  such as providing additional evidence  or an  explanation.  In  (3a-b) is  an 
A: Would you Iike to go see a movie tonight? 
B: Thanks. but I have an important test tomOlTOW morning. 
Tbe implicated conclusion, a strong implicature. is that B cannot go to the movies that night. but there is a 
weak implicature that were it not for having that test the next day B WOULD go  with A to the movies, 
and it is in order to convey this weak implicature that this particular form of utterance is chosen.  (The 
proposition conveyed by the weak implicature need not be true; it may be that the speaker is just trying to 
be polite (save A's 'face')-the strength of an implicature is directly proportional to the degree to  which 
the speaker takes responsibility for the hearer making that particular interpretation.  In this case,  if B 
wanted  to  be  sure  A  made  that interpretation. B  could add  How  about  next  week.  or some  such 
expression.) 
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example with  two possible interpretations (from Wilson and Sperber 1993:11).  In one 
interpretation the statement in (3a) provides evidence for the conclusion in (3b);  in the 
other the conclusion in (3a) is confirmed by the evidence presented in the statement in 
(3b).  In this case it would be possible for the speaker to constrain the hearer' s choice of 
one or the other of these two interpretations of the conceptual information by  adding 
procedural information (either so or after all) to the beginning of the second clause, as in 
(4a) and (4b) respectively. 
(3) a.  Peter' s not stupid. 
b.  He can find his own way horne. 
(4) a.  Peter' s not stupid, so he can find his own way horne. 
b.  Peter's not stupid, after all, he can find his own way horne. 
Discourse connectives such as  these are said by Wilson and Sperber to  not encode 
concepts (that is,  they do  not contribute to  truth conditions); they just constrain  the 
inferential phase of the comprehension, narrowing down the search for relevance, and 
thereby make the search easier, and make the interpretation selected more determinate. 
Gumperz (for example, 1977, 1982, 1989, 1992a, 1992b) has also argued that hearers 
interpret the meaning of an utterance based on inferences about the speaker's underlying 
strategies and intentions, and that these inferences are drawn on the basis of interpretive. 
frames (contexts) evoked by certain Hnguistic  or non-linguistic contextualisation cues 
produced by the speaker.  But as  with Relevance Theory, Gumperz sees a distinction 
between lexical content and contextualisation cues. 
Work by both Gumperz and those working in the Relevance Theory framework ass urne 
that language involves two types of elements, those that express conceptual information, 
and those that simply constrain the interpretation of the elements which express conceptual 
information.  I would argue that in fact there is no functional difference between the two 
types, as both types of elements constrain the creation of the context of interpretation for 
inferring the speaker's intention.  In Gumperz's terms, I would say alt of language is a 
contextualisation cue.  The goal of communication is not to decode the meaning in words 
(a view which is implied in the conceptual-procedural distinction), but to understand the 
speaker's communicative intention.  This can happen with or without language, and the 
only purpose of language in this process is to constrain the inferential deduction of the 
communicative intention.  Therefore the so-called 'conceptual' items are also constraining 
interpretation!  If  I hand an assistant a piece of paper and wave my hand towards sorneone 
else (who may be in a crowd of people) with the intention that the assistant should give the 
paper to hirn, the interpretation of the action and the person it is to  be given to is quite 
4  The  difference  between  lexical  and  grammatical  items  is  the  generalness  of use;  lexicalization 
(idiomization) and grammaticalization are the same process (conventionalization). but differ in terms of 
generalness.  See below for discussion. 120  Randy J. LaPolla 
unrestrained (though may be unproblematic in that context).  If, instead, I say Give it to 
hirn, the interpretation of the person it is to be given to is still relatively unconstrained, but 
if I say Give this paper to the tall man with the red hat by the back door, or Give this paper 
to  the  teacher,  then I  have  constrained the  interpretation of the  referents  involved 
considerably, and the constraining is mainly done by the extra lexical items.  (In this 
example there are both grammatical and non-grammatical elements, but this would not be 
true in alilanguages).  Given an expression like the teacher,  do we want to say that the 
'procedural'  marking (the  definite marking)  helps  us  interpret  the  'conceptual'  item 
teacher, or do we want to say that the phrase the teacher (rather than pointing or using a 
more general noun phrase) helps us identify the relevant referent?  One might argue that 
the is helping to constrain the  identification of the teacher by alerting the hearer to  the 
cognitive accessibility of the referent of teacher, and this is true, but the use of the word 
teacher itself, as opposed to a less specific term, is also helping to constrain the context of 
interpretation.  That is, both items are helping the hearer to identify a particular referent. 
Communication does not necessarily involve language, but the use  of any  amount of 
language constrains  the  interpretation  more  than  not  having language involved,  and 
generally the more explicit the language involved, the more constrained the interpretation. 
In this case, teacher would constrain the interpretation of a particular referent more than, 
for example, hirn,  or person.  The function  of both lexical  and grammatical means in 
constraining interpretation is the same.'  For example, those making a distinction between 
so called 'conceptual' information and 'procedural' information might say that adding the 
expression I guess to an English declarative dause such as in I guess he's corning would be 
adding conceptual information, while adding an evidential partide marking a guess to a 
similar clause in some other language that has grammaticalised evidential !Darking would 
be considered as adding only procedural information, yet the functionlinformation of both 
is  the  same.  It is  precisely because they have tbis fuoctioo that lexical items cao 
grammaticalise into grammatical markiog. 
3  The development of language structure 
Giv6n (1979a, Ch.  5;  1979b) has  argued that language develops from  pragmatic, 
loosely structured Iinguistic modes to tighter, more structured modes, and that these modes 
can be seen in the differences between child language and adult language, between pidgin 
languages and standard languages, between spoken and written registers, between informal 
and formal registers, and between unplanned and planned discourse.  Communication in 
the  pragmatic  mode  depends  largely  on  word  order  and  the  lexicon  alone,  while 
,  Langacker  (1987) argues that there is  DO difference between 'conceptual' and 'procedural' from the point 
of view !hat a11  linguistic structures are meaningful.  This is  similar to what I am saying, but only if we 
interpret 'meaningful' as 'having a role in constraining the creation of the context of interpretation'. 
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communication in the more syntacticised mode depends much more on conventionalised 
constructions and morphology in tightly structured relationships.  Grammar develops as 
the originally free collocations of lexical items become fixed in a particular structure.  Paul 
Hopper (1987, 1988) has developed this idea into the conception of grammar as 'emergent' 
from discourse.  He has argued that rather than taking grammar as a given (what he called 
'a priori grammar'), and then possibly seeing how discourse can affect grammar after it is 
established, linguists should see discourse as prior to grammar, and giving rise to grammar, 
as repeated patterns of discourse develop into what we think of as grammar.  Grammar is 
then  not seen as  fixed  structure,  but something that is  constantly evolving (see  also 
Langacker 1987, Ono and Thompson 1995). 
The emergent grammar view of the development of language structure is  a natural 
corollary of the  theory of ostensive-inferential communication just presented.  The 
discourse patterns that lead to the development of grammar are those that are repeatedly 
used for constraining the interpretation of utterances in a particular way.  For example, in 
Old English the word lic 'like' plus the instrumental suffix -e were used so often after an 
adjective to make explieit an adverbial relation to a verb that it became eonventionalised 
and developed into the adverb-forming suffix -ly used obligatorily in many contexts in 
English today (Lass 1992).  The frequent use of a demonstrative adjective to show that a 
referent was eognitively accessible conventionalised into definite  marking in  English 
(pyles and Aigeo 1982).  In Mandarin Chinese the frequent use of a preverballocative 
phrase where there was an implieature of an on-going event led to the development of a 
progressive  marker  from  the  loeative  verb  zai.  What  begins  as  a  eonversational 
implieature over time becomes conventionalised, so it is then a eonventional implicature, 
and then ean become further conventionalised until it is simply a part of the grammar that 
forces  a particular interpretation.  The differences between these three (conversational 
implicature,  eonventional  implieature,  and  obligatory  marking  forcing  a  particular 
interpretation) is the degree to which speakers are free to use or not use them to constrain 
the hearer's inferential process, and also the degree to whieh the form forces a particular 
interpretation.  We can think about grammaticalisation and the fixing of partieular patterns 
in language use Iike the creation of a path through a field (see Keller 1994).  One can cross 
a field any number of ways, and there was originally no difference between the part that 
eventually became the path and the rest of the field, except that people found it expedient 
to all go the  same way through the field, and so the grass was worn away, ereating the 
path.  Eventually people start using the path just because it is there, without thinking about 
whether it is the best way to  go through the  field.  At  same point, either out of simple 
conventionalisation or beeause of same social factor  (for example,  attitudes  towards 
preserving the grass that is left), it may become recognised as the  'unmarked' way to go 
through  the  field  and crossing any other way  would  be  considered  'marked'.  This 
conventionalisation is  the same  whether it is  the  fixing  of a partieular word order or 
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grammatical marking, or involves the extension of the use of already existing morphology. 
What we think of as a grammatical construction (or 'constructional schema'  -Langacker 
1987; Ono and Thompson 1995; Barlow and Kemmer 1994) is also simply a pattern of 
usage that was used often enough by enough people to constrain the hearer' s interpretation 
in a particular way that that usage became conventionalised. 
The fixing of repeated patterns into grammar is nothing more than the development of 
conventionalised forms that restrict interpretation, and Giv6n's cline of forms from more 
pragmatically  to  less pragmatically based  types correlates  with the degree  to  which 
interpretation is  constrained grammatically rather than  lexically.  The development of 
grammar out of repeated discourse patterns then can be seen as the fixing of constraints on 
the search for relevance during the process of interpretation.-
There are  at least four types of conventionalisation that affect language structure. 
Morphological means for constraining the interpretation of particular functional domains 
develop out of the repeated use of particular lexical items for constraining interpretation in 
a particular context.  An example from English is the development of definite marking 
from the frequent use of a demonstrative pronoun for constraining the identification of the 
referent of an expression to a contextually accessible referent. 
AIready available morphological marking may be extended in new ways and become 
conventionalised in that new use.  The extension of the use of the reflexive marker from 
direct reflexive situations to middle situations is a good example of this.  In this extension 
a marker that originally was used only to mark direct reflexives comes to be used in some 
middle  situations optionally with  an  emphatic  sense  to  narrow  the range of possible 
interpretations  (for example,  the  use  of myself in  I  stood myself up constrains  the 
interpretation of the purposefulness of the action), and later comes to be used so often that 
it becomes obligatory for many verbs.  This happened in the Romance languages (see 
Kemmer 1993), and also in the Tibeto-Burman language Dulong (LaPolla 1995b;  see 
example below).' 
_  Thougb I am presenting this from the point of view of constraints on interpretation, I do not assume that 
linguistic change is hearer-driven.  From one point of view we can say it is speaker-driven, as the patterns 
can only become conventionalized if speakers choose to  use  the patterns over and over again.  From 
another point of view the conventionalization process  takes  time,  and  involves  the  same  people  as 
speakers and hearers.  That is, a speaker uses a particular pattern and other people pick up on that (we are 
creatures of habit and imitation), and repeated use of that pattern by  a number of people causes it to 
become grammaticalized (such as  the same-subject interpretation of English clause-coordination).  The 
same  is  true  of lexicalization.  Language developmenl  is  an  'invisible hand'  phenomenon;  il  is  an 
epiphenomenon which results from the actions of many individuals (Keller 1994), and so we cannol say it 
is speaker or hearer driven. 
7  Once Ibis happens, there is  then no  formal  distinction between reflexives and middles,  and so  some 
languages  then reinforce or renew the direct reflexive  marking.  again  being driven  by  the  des ire  10 
constrain the interpretation.  This has happened, for example, in Dulch (Kemmer 1993). 
• 
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A third type of conventionalisation is the fixing of syntactic (rather than morphological) 
constraints  on  interpretation,  such  as  many  of those  associated with  the  concept  of 
'subject' in English, for example the cross-dause same-subject constraint in coordination 
with a reduced second dause (see discussion below).  This development is simply the 
fossilisation of a frequent pattern of coreference.  Like in the path analogy given above, a 
particular coreference pattern between the two dauses became so common it became the 
unmarked and assumed pattern through conventionalisation. 
A fourth type of conventionalisation is a type of secondary grammaticalisation where a 
form  that  has  grammaticalised from  a  lexical  item  and  at  first  only constrains  the 
interpretation of the  external described situation later further  grammaticalises  in  the 
direction of constraining the interpretation of subjective (speaker-oriented, expressive) 
aspects of the interpretation, with a stage in between of marking textual cohesion (that is, 
the path of development is 'propositional «> textual) > (expressive»'; Traugott 1990:497; 
see also Traugott 1982, 1988, 1989, 1990; Traugott and König 1991).  An example of the 
fuH  set of changes is English since, which developed from the propositional sense 'after, 
from the time that' to a marker of temporal relation, and from inference from the temporal 
relation to a marker of a causal relation (Traugott 1990:497). 
4  Wby languages difTer 
Language is a tool  which  aids in the process of inference and so is  shaped by the 
demands of that process, just as a hammer is shaped the way it is because the main use it is 
put to is hammering nails.  The development of particular types of linguistic structure is 
not teleological, any more than the evolutionary development of species iso  lt is in fact a 
type  of evolution, though  an  aspect of socio-cultural evolution rather than biological 
evolution.  This applies equally to the development of the lexicon and the development of 
morphosyntax (which are actually not two separate things-see below).  Language is what 
Keller (1994)  caHs  'a phenomenon of the  third kind'.  That is,  it is  not  a  natural 
phenomenon, and it is not an intentionally created artifact of humans.  Language is the 
cumulative result of the actions of many individual humans, but their actions are not with 
the intention to create language; language is the unintended byproduct of their attempts to 
communicate effectively (constrain the addressee's inferential process effectively) on  an 
individual level.  It forms as if guided by some invisible hand, much the way economies 
and paths in fields develop (see above). 
Just as  the  evolution of species is related to  particular environments,  many of the 
conventions of a people are responses or adaptations to particular environmental factors, 
such  as  building  houses  on  stilts  where  there  is  frequent  flooding.  We  find 
conventionalisations of language also related to particular environments.  FOT example, it is 
no  coincidence that  the  Qiang people  of Sichuan,  China,  who  live  on  the  sides  of 
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Burman) a complex system of direction prefixes including prefixes marking  'up-river' 
versus  'down-river'  and  'up the  mountain'  versus  'down the mountain'  (LaPolIa  to 
appear), as in (5). 
(5)  Qiang directional prefixes (lfue 'throw') 
taKU  'throw up (the mountain), 
fiaJfu  'throw down (the mountain)' 
saKU  'throw down-river' . 
naKU  'throw up-river' 
zalfu 'throw towards the speaker' 
daKU  'throw away from the speaker' 
aKU  'throw inside' 
haKU  'throwoutside' 
There has been work (e.g.  Bernstein 1971, Perkins 1980, Trudgilll996, 1997) showing 
that the size and complexity of the speech community will influence the use patterns of the 
language spoken, and this in tum will influence the form that the language takes.  For 
example, complex inflectional deictic systems such as the one we find in Qiang are said to 
be  more often  found  in  small  homogeneous  communities  rather than  large complex 
communities (perkins 1980). 
We often find the same types of structures appearing in totally unrelated languages, but 
again, in parallel with evolution, where both sharks and dolphins have similar body shapes 
even though they are unrelated creatures, and bats, birds, and butterflies alI have wings, 
similarities among conventions are not due to some predetermined or universal genetic 
imprint,  but due to  similar adaptations to  similar environments.  For example, many 
societies have independently developed bowl-like implements in response to the need to 
drink liquids and the nature of liquids. 
The particular patterns we find used to constrain the interpretation reflect particular 
ways of construing and representing the world.  As language structure is formed from 
repeated discourse patterns that constrain the hearer's interpretation in paiticular ways, it 
necessarily must be the case that those aspects that were being constrained were salient to 
the speaker and also assumed by the speaker to be salient or relevant to the hearer, at least 
in the contexts where the pattern was used.  For example, Pawley and Lane (1998) argue 
that to understand the grammaticalisation of serial verb constructions in Kalam (Papuan, 
New Guinea), it is necessary to understand that in reporting an event, a speaker of Kalam 
is expected to make reference to a sequence of associated actions that express whether the 
actor was at the scene of the event or moved to the scene; what the actor did; whether the 
actor then left the scene, and if so whether the actor took the affected object along or not; 
and what the final outcome was.  That is, where in English we would usually mention a 
single action to represent aseries of related actions, for example, I cut firewood. in Kalam 
the individual associated (prerequisite and consequent) actions would be made explicit. 
The interpretation of these aspects of the action are then generally more constrained in 
Kalam than in English.  The expression of the various aspects of the overall multi-scene 
event or action in Kalam can be elaborately spread over many clauses, spread over just a 
few clauses, or, in the case of relatively familiar multi-scene events, can be done with a 
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serial verb construction.  It is the fact of the salience of mentioning all these different 
aspects  of an  event, plus the fact that some types of action  sequences are performed 
regularly,  that  caused  these  serial  verb  constructions  to become  conventionalised 
(grammaticalised).  In this case it is easy to see the 'smoking gun' of the demand on event 
narration that led to this grarnmaticalisation, but we do not need to find the 'smoking gun' 
in  all cases to know that the grarnmaticalised patterns reflect the salience of the type of 
information being constrained. 
Another example of how construal of the world affects the sort of conventionalisations 
that develop is discussed by Heine (1994, see also Heine 1997a, 1997b).  He argues that 
there are four main basic event schemas (conceptual source structures) that give rise to the 
different types of comparative constructions found in the world's languages, and that how 
a particular group of people construe the comparative relation determines the type and 
structure of the comparative construction used by those people (X = the comparee (the 
thing  being compared),  Y = standard of comparison, Z = quality;  this is necessarily 
brief-see Heine 1997a, Ch.  6 for more detailed discussion): 
The Location Schema:  the relation is construed in terms of relative location:  Xis Y at 
Z; e.g. Rawang adw nÜi apüT) madam yäT)e [Adeu TOP Apung above/on tall-INTRANS.NPAST] 
'Adeu is taller than Apung'. 
The Action Schema:  the comparee is seen as a kind of agent which surpasses, defeats, 
exceeds, etc.  the standard of comparison in some way:  X surpasses Z with regard to Y; 
e.g. Cantonese T);}/3 kcrs-kw:r3 Iei/3 [1sG tall-surpass you]  'I am taller than you'. 
The Polarity Schema:  the relation is  construed as  antithetic juxtaposition of two 
antonymical quaIities:  Xis Y, Z is -V; e.g.  Hixkaryana kaw-ohra naha waraka. kaw naha 
kaywerye [tall-not he.is Waraka tall  he.is Kaywerye]  'Kaywerye is taller than Waraka' 
(Stassen 1985: 184, cited in Heine 1997a: 117). 
The Temporal or Sequence Schema:  what comes earlier is seen as having more of the 
quality  than  what comes later:  X is  Y,  then  Z;  e.g.  Javanese enak daging karo iwak 
[is.good meat  than  fish]  'Meat is  better than  fish'  (Stassen  1985:60, cited in  Heine 
1997a:118; karo is also used as a consecutive conjunction) 
One  subset  of conventions  often  influences  another  subset of conventions.  For 
example, in Australia and the US  open-plan kitchens are popular, but in Hong Kong, as 
many people have maids, open plan kitchens are not popular.  One set of conventions 
(related to  housework)  has  influenced another  set of conventions  (related to  house-
building).  In terms of the set of conventions related to communication (language and 
language  use),  we  can also find that  it  is  influenced by sets  of conventionalisations 
involved in other (non-linguistic) sets of conventions.  For example, the conventions of 
language use in Javanese are very much influenced by the conventions of the caste system 
and social status in the society in general (Errington 1988).  The Jinghpaw people of China 
and Myanmar do  not have a word for  'toilet'  (Le.  a place to defecate); as  they don't 
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go out in the woods.  Here the conventions of farming have influenced the conventions of 
architecture, and the latter have influenced the conventions of language. 
There are also sometimes competing motivations (DuBois 1985) for one pattern or 
another, but the process of a particular form becoming conventionalised is the same.  For 
example, English lost the distinction between singular and plural second person pronouns 
because of a repeated pattern of using the plural pronoun when referring to  a singular 
referent out of politeness considerations (that is, constraining the context of interpretation 
to the individual was seen as less polite than not constraining it in that way, and then the 
form used to constrain the interpretation to the singular individual disappeared from the set 
of conventions), but some Southern (U.S.) dialects have conventionalised a second person 
plural form y'  all from repeated use of all after you  to constrain the interpretation of 
singular vs.  plural referents. 
To say that the original development of a particular pattern is motivated does not imply 
that the motivation will always be transparent.  In many discussions of ethnosyntax, the 
opaqueness of certain structures is taken to be evidence that it is not possible to show a link 
between language and other sets of conventions.  Yet in many aspects of our lives, once a 
particular way of doing something is conventionalised, the original motivation may be lost, 
while the conventionalised behaviour continues, simply because it is already a convention. 
For example, when British people first began drinking tea, they were forced to put the milk 
in the cup before the tea because the ceramics produced in Britain at that time were not 
able to withstand the heat of the tea directly without cracking, and so the milk was put in 
first to protect the teacup.  Later they had access to better cerarnics, and so the motivation 
for putting the milk in before the tea was gone, but by that time the practice had become 
conventionalised, and is still continued by many people to this day.  Another example is 
that early cIocks had chains with weights descending out the bottom of the cIock, as the 
weights ran  the cIock.  Modern cIocks  are  now  largely electronic, but are often  still 
designed to have the weight chains (or stylised representations of them) because that 
particular conception of a cIock had become so conventionalised.  In language, we have 
many expressions that are no longer motivated by their semantics, but reflect earlier lexical 
uses  or ways of construing the world.  For example, we often use fixed expressions in 
English  such as pig in a poke, pass the buck,  put it in  the hopper,  or the stars in  the 
finnament,  yet few speakers of English know what a poke is, or what a buck is, or what a 
hopper is (why it is called a hopper), or that the wordfirmament derives from a view of the 
heavens as a fixed dome.  We often say dial a phone. even though our phones now have 
push-buttons rather than dials.  In Chinese the motivation für the old word for 'crow', wü, 
is not at all transparent, but if we reconstruct the original form of the word we can see that 
it was onomatopoetic (*78).  In Chinese also the words for 'cash money'. xiimjin [current-
gold], and 'bank', yinhfmg [silver company], were originally motivated by the  fact that 
gold and silver were the conventional currencies.  This is no longer the case, but the names 
continue to be used.  The same is true of grammatical patterns/morphology:  the original 
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motivation may no longer be  transparent, but that does not mean there never was any 
motivation for the pattern, such as the -r- in children, a remnant of an old plural marker, 
now redundant because of the -en plural marker, but retained neverthe!ess. 
I mentioned above Heine's work showing that how speakers of a language construe a 
particular situation, such as a comparative relation, determines the type and structure of the 
Iinguistic construction used by those people in talking about that situation.  Heine (1994) 
also shows that there are cIear areal distribution patterns (that cross genetic lines) for the 
different event schemas behind the different comparative construction types.  Heine's 
concIusion  is  that  'areal  distribution  plays  a  major role  in  the  cognitive patterning 
underlying the development of comparative constructions in the languages of the world, 
and areal distribution is suggestive of massive linguistic and cultural communication' 
(Heine 1994:66).  That is, because of massive contact, the speakers of the languages of an 
area come to construe an aspect of the world in the same way, that is, share the same event 
schema, and this leads them to have similar Iinguistic constructions for representing that 
schema.  The influence of language contact on language development is then not always 
directly Iinguistic.  Leaming another language means learning to think in a different way, 
or to construe the world in a different way, and this may then affect our native language. 
This is often what calquing iso  Calquing is not necessarily direct linguistic influence, the 
way loan words are.  It is often the result of influence in the way people construe events or 
situations.  Substraturn effects can also be of this type, that is, the effect of a way  of 
thinking or the effect of deep-seated habits of language use.  That is, if our native language 
obligatorily constrains the interpretation of some functional  domain,  when we  leam a 
second language, we will tend to want to constrain the interpretation of that domain in the 
new language.  For example, in Taiwan Mandarin we regularly find a complementiser ju:r
5 
(= 'to say'), which is due to the fact that the majority of the speakers of Taiwan Mandarin 
speak  Southern  Min  Chinese  as  their  first  language,  and  this  language  has  a 
complementiser b1.f1  (=  'to  say')  which  helps  to  constrain  the  interpretation  of 
complements.  When  speaking Mandarin,  the  Min  speakers feIt  the need for  such a 
complementiser because of their habit of  constraining the interpretation in this way in their 
own language, and so created a comparable one based on the Mandarin word for 'say'. 
This is filling a perceived gap.  The same sort of thing happens when English speakers 
leam Chinese.  I mention below that in Chinese no genitive phrase is necessary in an 
expression that would  translate  as  'I washed my hair', but English speakers leaming 
Chinese often will add a genitive phrase in that context when speaking Chinese because 
they fee! it is needed to constrain the interpretation.  In a similar way, due to their habit of 
marking tense in every finite cIause, English speakers leaming Chinese will overuse the 
perfective aspect marker in Chinese, essentially using it in any situation they  would 
normally use a past tense in English.  This is because they feel  the need to constrain the 
interpretation of the utterance by marking it as  past tense, but as Chinese does not have 
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perceived gap.  The feeling of needing to constrain the interpretation in a particular way 
may also come from outside one's own language.  For example, the third person pronoun 
in Chinese does not inflect for animacy or gender, but in the early 20th century many 
Chinese intellectuals leamed English, French, or German, and came to feel the need to 
constrain, at least in writing, the interpretation of the referent of the third person pronoun, 
and so developed different ways of writing the third person pronoun in Chinese for male 
female, inanimate, and godly referents.  ' 
The spread of borrowed words and borrowed patterns is the same process as that for 
native  words  and  patterns.  Borrowed  words  and  patterns  may  introduce  new 
conceptsltools, but the ultimate meaning of the word or pattern will be determined by the 
use to which it is put.  For example, the English word gungho is a loan of Chinese kUlf5 
xr35 'industrial cooperative' in Chinese, but in English it means 'to have great spirit or 
enthusiasm'  (derived  from  the  enthusiastic  spirit  which  American  soldiers  feit 
characterised the workers in China's early industrial cooperatives).  This is the same with 
other tools.  In the Philippines, a fork and a spoon are often used when eating, due to 
Western influence, but instead of the fork being used to move the food to the mouth, the 
fork is used only to push the food onto the spoon, and then the spoon is used to carry the 
food to the mouth.  That is, the 'use/meaning' of the fork in that system is different.  Also, 
a set of conventions is a system, and sometimes if you try to change one aspect of a 
system, you have to change others because of amismatch.  For example, in Taiwan now it 
is common to use large plates to hold the rice when eating (instead of the traditional 
bowls), due to Western influence, but they still use chopsticks to eat, and as these two tools 
are not very compatible, the Chinese spoon is used to take the food off the plate, where it 
can then be better accessed by the chopsticks.  That is, they use the spoon.1o pick up the 
food off the plate, and then use the chopsticks to eat the food off the spoon. 
Our language use is a set of habits we form, and these habits are very hard to change. 
We are  very much creatures of habit, and once we  have ahabit, it is  hard to change, 
induding habits of language and even thought.  The most simple example is the habit we 
form in leaming our first language:  we  leam to categorise certain sounds together as 
allophones of a single phoneme, and to distinguish among other sounds our language treats 
as distinct phonemes.  This is entirely ahabit, but as anyone who has leamed a second 
language (or taken a dass in phonetics) knows, it is difficult to break the habit and make 
distinctions we are not used to making.  The habit even influences our perception, as (for 
example) a native English speaker will really 'hear' a voiceless unaspirated stop as if it is 
the  same sound as  a  voiced stop (for example, hear the  initial  sound in pei214  tr;i1:P 
'Beijing' as Ibl).  Another good example is phonotactics.  There is a set of permissible 
syllable types in English, and the habit of speaking those types and only those types is so 
strong that when a writer makes up  a new  syllable, it will  invariably conform to  that 
template (Whorf 1940[1956]).  This is also what is involved in second language leamer 
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accents.  The point is not that you cannot leam another set of phonotactic constraints, just 
that it is difficult because it is an ingrained habit. 
5 How languages difTer 
It has been said that languages differ not so much in what they can say, but in what they 
must say.  This is looking at it from the speaker's point of view.  From the hearer's point of 
view, we can say that languages differ not so much in what can be understood, but in what 
must be understood.  All  languages can constrain the interpretation of just about any 
functional domain, but most languages have developed obligatory grammatical marking 
that obligatorily constrains the interpretation in certain functional domains to some extent. 
Which domains the speakers of a language will chose to constrain, and how they constrain 
the interpretation, are  the  two major ways  languages differ from each other.  Just as 
societies differ as  to what tools they use  for a particular activity, for example using 
chopsticks as opposed to using the hands or a fork for eating, and these tools can vary in 
terms of specificity (for example, Chinese people traditionally use fewer specialised tools 
for eating than Westerners), the tool we think of as language can differ between cultures in 
terms of how specialised its structures are.  I would like to turn now to some examples of 
the ways that languages can differ in terms of specialisation, and show how this relates to 
interpretation. 
For a number of years I have been arguing that Chinese and most other Sino-Tibetan 
languages do not work the same way, in terms of pivots and grammatical relations, as 
either languages with largely nominative-accusative structure, such as English, or those 
that have largely ergative structure, such as Dyirbal (LaPolla 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995a, 
1996,2002; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Ch.  6).  For example, in a language with an  [S, 
Al pivot for coordination (the accusative pattern), such as English, an argument shared by 
two conjoined non-passive dauses can be represented by a zero pronoun in the second 
dause only if it is in the A or S role in both dauses, as in (6a). 
(6)a.  The man went downhilI and 0 saw the dog. 
b.  *The dog went downhill and the man saw 0 . 
c.  The dog went downhilI and 0 was seen by the man. 
It is not possible to have the representation of the actor of the first dause coreferring 
with a zero pronoun representing the undergoer (0 role argument) of the second dause 
without using a passive construction, as shown in (6b).  It is not possible to say *The dog 
went downhill and the man saw.  If  the argument the two clauses have in common is the 
undergoer  of the  second  clause,  in  order for  the  two clauses to  be  conjoined,  the 
representation of the argument (here the zero pronoun) must appear as the single direct 
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~n a  lan~uage with an  [S,O]  pivot for coordination (the ergative pattern), such as 
DYlrbal (Dlxon  1~8?:461ff), a shared argument which appears as a zero pronoun in the 
second of ~o  conJomed clauses must be in the S or 0  role in each dause, as in (7a).  If  the 
arg~~ent m the second clause is instead in the A role, in order for the two dauses to be 
conJomed and for the argument to be represented by a zero pronoun in the second clau 
the  shared argument must appear  as  the  single  direct  argument of an  anti passte, 
construction, as in (~b).  It is not possible to say the equivalent of The man went downh;l~ 
and saw the. dog Wlth  a  transitive second verb and a zero anaphor referring to  an  A 
argument, as m (7c) (fromDixon 1980:461-2).8 
(7)a.  Ba/an  guda  bU1Ja-n  baygul  yara-1Jgu 
she+ABS  dog+ABS  descend-PAST  he+ERG  man-ERG 
bura-n. 
'The dog went downhill and was seen by the man.' 
(Lit.:  The dog went  downhill and the man saw 0.) 
see-PAST 
b.  Bayi  yara  bU1Ja-n  bulral1Janyu 
he+ABS  man+ABS  descend-PAST  see+PAST+ANTI 
'The man went downhill and saw the dog. ' 
(with antipassive indicator ~-y  on the second verb). 
bagun  gudagu. 
he+ABs  dog+DAT 
c.  *Bayi  yara  bU1Ja-n  bura-n  baygul 
he+ABS  man+ABS  descend-PAST  see-PAST  he+ERG 
guda. 
dog+ABS 
'The man went downhill and saw the dog.' 
(with transitive verb and A argument (yaraqu) unexpressed). 
In Chinese we don't find either the English or the Dyirbal type of restriction on cross-
clause coreference.  In Chinese it is possible for the shared argument of a conjoined 
structure to be deleted regardless of whether it is in the A or 0  role, as we can see from the 
examples in (8): 
(8)a.  Xiao-goui  zou  dao  shän-dtxia,  nel-ge-ren 
~ttle-~og  walk  to  mountain-bottom  that-CL-person 
The little dog went downhill and was seen by the man. ' 
(Lit.:  'The little dog went downhilI and the man saw 0.  ') 
b.  Nei-ge-reni  zou  dao  shän-dtxia  jiu  ~i 
that-cL-person  walk  to  mountain-bottom  then 
'The man went downhiII and saw the little dog.' 
jiu  kilnjian-le  ~i. 
then  see-PFV 
kilnjian-le  xiao-gou. 
see-PFV  little-dog 
8  Ab~revi~tions used in  the examples: 1,2,3 1st, 2nd, 3rd person; ABS absolutive; AGT agentive; ANTI 
anIlP.ass.lve;  ~  class~fier;  C~M  change  of state;  DAT dative;  DIR  directional;  ERG ergative;  LOC 
locatlve. INF  IDfe~enl1ally denved conclusion; INIRANS.PAST third person intransitive past; NPAST 
non-p~st d~claratlve; PFV  perfective;  PL  plural;  PROG  progressive;  PS  predicate  sequence;  RIM 
reflexlve/mtddle; SG singular; TMDYS  past tense,  I day-l  year aga; TMHRs past tense,  within today; 
TMYRS past tense, years ago; TRANS.PAST 3rd person transitive past. 
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The result of this situation is that in languages with grammatical constraints on the 
control of anaphor like those we've just looked at,  those constraints force a particular 
interpretation of an utterance.  For example, if the words 'The man saw the dog and went 
downhilI'  were said in English, the interpretation would have to be that the MAN went 
downhilI; but if the equivaIent words were used in DyirbaI (balan guda ba1Jgul yaran1Jgu 
buran bU1Jan),  the meaning would have to be that the DOG went downhill.  This forcing of 
the interpretation holds even if the resuIting interpretation would be nonsensical given 
what  English  speakers  normally  assume  about  the  world,  as  in  (9),  from  Comrie 
(1988:191): 
(9)  The man dropped the melon and burst. 
Because of the grammaticaI constraint on conjunction reduction in English, this sentence 
has to be interpreted as saying that the man burst after dropping the melon.  That is, when 
there  is  a  coordinate  structure  such  as  this,  the  rules  of English  syntax force  the 
interpretation that the zero pronoun is coreferential with the S or A role argument of the 
first dause, and block the inclusion in the context of interpretation of the assumption that 
when someone drops something, it is more likely that the thing dropped bursts rather than 
the person doing the dropping.  In a language such as Chinese, though, where there is no 
such grammaticaI constraint on interpretation, the equivaIent sentence would not force 
such an interpretation, even with the man being the topic of the utterance, as assumptions 
from real world experience would be included in the context of interpretation and influence 
the interpretation more than the syntactic structure.  Over the years I have asked weIl over 
a hundred native speakers of Chinese to translate this sentence into Chinese and then tell 
me who or what burst.  The answer is invariably 'Of course the melon burst.'  They are 
generally quite surprised when I tell them that the English sentence MUST mean that the 
man burst. 
In Rawang, a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in Northern Burma, we have the same 
lack of constraints on the interpretation of dause coordination, as evidenced by the pair of 
sentences in (10): 
(10)  a.  V  pungf V  d~sVng  vdip b~a  n~  ng~a.pm  i 
Vpung-f  V~-svng  vdip  b~-a  n~  ng~-ap-i 
Apung-AGT  Adeu-LOC  hit  PFV-TRANS.PASTPS  cry-TMDYS-INTRANS.PAST 
'Apung hit Adeu and cried.' (Adeu cried) 
b.  Vpungf Vd~svng  vdip b~a  n~  v~shi  a.pmi 
Vpung-f  V~-sVng  vdip  b~-a  ~ 
Apung-AOT  AdeU-LOC  hit  PFV-TRANS.PAST  PS 
ap-i 
TMDYS-INTRANS.PAST 
'Apung hit Adeu and laughed.' (Apung laughed). 
vh;-shi 
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Here the  structures  are exactly the  same,  though  the  actor of the  second clause  is 
interpreted differently due to real world expectations of who would be more Iikely to cry or 
laugh after an act of hitting.  In fact the interpretation is quite unrestrained; a1though I've 
written  'Adeu  cried'  and  'Apung  laughed'  after the  free  translations,  actually  the 
interpretation could be that the one who cried or laughed was either one of these  two 
people, or even a third person, such as  someone standing nearby watching what was 
happening between Adeu and Apung.  Most Sino-Tibetan languages are similar to Chinese 
and Rawang in not having syntactic constraints that force particular interpretations of 
cross-clause coreference. 
Let's look at some other ways that the grammar of English constrains interpretation. 
One way is with verb agreement.  Aside from the obvious effect that verb agreement has 
on the identification of particular arguments, it can also constrain the interpretation of the 
syntactic structure.  To borrow an example from Green (1996:144), the use of singular 
versus plural agreement in (lla) and (llb) forces two different analyses of the structures. 
In (lla) pickles and ice-cream must be interpreted as two different iteros about which the 
same predication is made, while in (llb) they must be interpreted as one item (a dish with 
two things combined) about which a predication is made. 
(11) a.  Pickles and ice cream are really great. 
b.  Pickles and ice cream is really great. 
In Chinese it is not possible to constrain the interpretation in this way, as there is no 
agreement marking, so there would be only one form for both these meanings in Chinese; 
the inferential process involved in deciding on the proper structure (and therefore the 
proper interpretation) would not be constrained by the linguistic form in the way that it is 
in English. 
In terms of whether a language constrains the interpretation of the relations between 
elements  of a  complex  clause  structure  or not,  we  can  give  the  example  of verb 
juxtaposition in Lahu.  Matisoff (1991:403) gives an example with the verb q5 'hoe' in 
simple juxtaposition with 12 other verbs, and contrasts the use of this one syntactic form 
(simple juxtaposition) in Lahu with the use of six different types of construction for 
expressing the same relations in English (see (12».  There is nothing in the grammar of 
this Lahu construction that constrains the interpretation of the relationship between the two 
verbs, while in English the interpretation is constrained to a greater degree by the different 
constructions used. 
(12) complementary infinitives  qSSa  'easy to hoe'  gaq5  'help to hoe' 
-ing complements  q5 ki  'busy hoeing'  taq5  'start hoeing' 
modal auxiliaries  q5 ca  'should hoe'  gaq5  'musthoe' 
adverbs  q5ba  'hoe away'  q3?  q5  'hoe again' 
prepositional phrases  q3pf  'hoe for smn'  phO?q3  'hoe in a group' 
subordinate clauses  q5ni  'hoe and see'  caq3  'go and hoe'. 
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Tense marking also restricts the search for the relevant interpretation.  For example, to 
interpret the proper time frame  for the situation expressed by the Chinese sentence in 
(Ba), the hearer must depend on inference based on the context, whether overall what is 
being talked about is something that happened in the past or a current situation.  In English, 
though, as English has grammaticalised obligatory tense marking, the equivalent of (13a) 
would be (13b), (13c), or (13d), all of which constrain the interpretation of the time frame. 
(As can be seen from this example, the identification of the gender of the referent (and 
therefore the identification of the referent) of some pronouns is  also constrained by the 
form of the pronoun, and this too in Chinese is unconstrained.) 
(13) a.  Tä  qu  xuexiao. 
3sG  go  school 
b.  SheIHe went to schoo!. 
c.  SheIHe is going to school 
d.  She goes to schoo!.lHe goes to schoo!. 
We can see that compared to Chinese, English obligatorily constrains the interpretation 
of the time frame,  Iimiting the identification to either a past or non-past situation, but 
within those broad categories, say, for example given a past tense fonn, to determine how 
far in the past the action was the interpreter of the utterance must rely on linguistically 
unconstrained inference.  That is, if I say I have had lunch, then you will probably draw 
the inference that I ate within the last hour or two, or at least within today; if I say I have 
been to the doctor, then you may make the inference that it was within the last few days; if 
I say I have been to Tibet, then you will not make the inference that it was within the last 
one or two hours, or even within the last few days, as it could have been quite some time 
ago, but the differences among these three interpretations are not due to anything in the 
grammatical  structure,  they  are  due  purely  to  inferences  based  on  the  real-world 
understanding of the actions involved.  The search for the proper interpretation of the 
length of time from an overtly marked past action to  the time of the  speech act is  not 
further constrained grammatically in English.  If  we then compare English to Rawang, we 
can see that in Rawang there is a four-way past tense system which marks whether the 
action took place an hour or two ago, a few hours ago but within this day, sometime from 
yesterday up to a year ago, or more than a year ago.  The examples in (14) a11  are of the 
verb dr 'to go'. 
(14) a.  ang  df  a:m-i 
3sG  go  DIR-INTRANS.PAST 
'S/he left, went away (within the last 2 hours).' 
b.  ang  df  dar-i. 
3SG  go  TMHRS-INTRANS.PAST 
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c.  äng  di  ap-mi. 
3sG  go  TMDYS-INTRANS.PAST 
'S/he went (within the last year).' 
d.  ang  di  yäng-i. 
3sG  go  TMYRS-INTRANS.PAST 
'S/he went (some time a year or more ago).' 
The point isthat languages differ quite a lot in how much they constrain the search for 
the most relevant interpretation, and in what aspects they choose to constrain.  As can be 
seen from these examples, while Rawang constrains the interpretation of the time frame 
more than English, it does not constrain the search for the referent of a pronoun as much as 
English does (and we saw Rawang does not have the cross-clause coreference constraint 
that English has).  From this we can see that we can not talk about languages as being 
more or less  grammaticalised or their interpretation  more  or less constrained,  only 
particular functional domains beingmore or less grammaticalised or their interpretation 
more or less constrained in a certain language. 
An interesting three-way contrast of what is  or is not left to inference in different 
languages can be seen from a comparison of Chinese, Tagalog and English.  The normal 
way of saying 'Let's go' in Chinese involves just a verb and a particIe, as in (I5a), and 
only the use of the hortative particIe constrains the interpretation of the actor referent (so it 
could be 'you go' or 'we go', but not 'he goes'); in Tagalog, as in (15b), it is normal to just 
say Tayo  na,  which is  the  1st person plural incIusive pronoun plus a change of state 
marker, with no verb, and leave the interpretation of the action suggested unconstrained (it 
could mean 'Let's go' or 'It's our turn'), while in EngIish both the pronoun and the verb 
must be specified, so the interpretation of the actor and the action are both obligatorily 
constrained. 
(15) a.  Zou  baI 
go  HORTATIVE.PARTICLE 
'Let's go.' or '(Why don't) you go.' 
b.  Tayo  nal 
IPL.INCL  CSM 
'Let's go.' or '!t's our turn.' 
Languages can also differ in terms of the type of grammaticalisation used to constrain 
the interpretation of a particular functional domain.  For example, in the Chinese sentence 
in (16a), there is no marking to constrain the interpretation of whose hair is being washed, 
and so the determination of this relationship is purely a matter of inference; in most 
contexts it would mean the person is washing his  or her own hair, but given the right 
circumstances (such as a professional hair-washer in a barber shop) it could mean the 
person is washing someone else's hair.  In both English and Rawang, on the other hand, 
the interpretation of whose hair is being washed is obligatorily constrained, but in different 
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ways.  In English, example (16b), the NP which has hair as  its head must incIude  a 
ssessive pronoun, but in Rawang, example (16c), there is no marking on the NP; the 
interpretation is constrained by the obIigatory use of the reflexiveImiddIe marking (see 
LaPolia 2(00). 
(16) a.  Tä  zai  Xl  taufli. 
3SG  PROG  wash  hair 
'S/he is washing (herlhis) hair.' (Lit.:  'S/he is washing hair. ') 
b.  He is washing his hair. 
c.  ang 
3SG 
ni  zvl-shi  oe. 
hair  wash-RlM-NPAST 
'S/he is washing herlhis hair.' 
In both English and Rawang the interpretation of the relationship between the actor and the 
undergoer is constrained, but by very different grammatical categories. 
6  Summary and implicatioDS of this view of  language 
A speaker (communicator) performs an ostensive act in order to communicate.  This 
gets the attention of the hearer (interpreter), and the hearer must first infer that the speaker 
has a communicative intention and that it is directed at the hearer.  Then the hearer must 
infer the reason for the communicator to make that particular ostensive act in the context of 
the communicative activity.  All of this is done using inference; all aspects of interpretation 
involve the creation of a set of assumptions, a context, which can be added to  whatever 
part of the signal or message has been recovered up to that point (it is a dynarnic process) 
to deduce the most likely form and possible motivation for its production.  This inference 
is possible  because  of the  assumption  that an  ostensive  act  involves  a  guarantee  of 
relevance, and that the communicator will chose the form for the ostensive act that will 
most likely lead to the intended interpretation.  Because of this assumption, the speaker 
must tailor the ostensive act in  such  a way  that the  hearer will  not  have to  expend 
unnecessary effort to  create a context that will  allow himlher to arrive at the intended 
interpretation.  In doing this,  the speaker takes into consideration guesses as  to  what 
information is available to the hearer at the time of utterance for use in interpreting the 
utterance.  The  speaker may  constrain  the  hearer's  construction  of the  context  of 
interpretation in many ways.  The most straightforward reflection of this constraining 
process is the amount of lexical content that the communicator includes in the utterance. 
Grammaticalised marking  (incIuding intonation) can  also  be used to  help  the hearer 
process the utterance by constraining the search for relevant assumptions to include in the 
context of interpretation.  The grammatical marking performs the same role in constraining 
or guiding the interpretation of the utterance that an increase in the number of lexical items 
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patterns of language used for constraining the context of interpretation in a particular way. 
As each society of language users determines what functional domains will constrain and 
how it will do it, languages come to differ in terms of what will be constrained and what 
will not, in terms of the degree to which interpretation of a particular functional domain is 
constrained, and how particular functional domains are constrained.  This is why  we get 
the  variety we do among the languages of the world.  As individual speakers also have 
some choice in what they constrain and how  they do it (and develop their own habits, 
parallel to societal conventions), we also get variety from speaker to speaker within a 
particular society of language users. 
What I  am  arguing for involves a different way of viewing structure.  Rather than 
assuming  that  language  structures  are  the  building  blocks  of relatively  effortless 
deterministic interpretation and treating ambiguous expressions as  aberrant, we  should 
assume that forms  used in communication are inherently indeterminate (Reddy  1979; 
Grace  1987),  and  look  at  structure  from  the  point  of view  of how  it constrains 
interpretation, that is, how interpretation is made more determinate by, for example, the 
grammaticalisation of subject or other grarnmatical categories.  Most linguistic studies, 
even many of those that use natural language data rather than made-up sentences, still take 
the grarnmar as given, and only look for the 'interface' between semantics and syntax or 
pragmatics and syntax.  For many, such as  Susumo Kuno (for example 1987) and Ellen 
Prince (for example 1988), pragmatics is simply another module of the package, and not 
the foundation of communication and therefore of grarnmar!  The view I am presenting 
here is that the fundamental aspect of communication is not the Iinguistic structure, but the 
interaction of the speaker and hearer in performing a communicative activity.  The role of 
the context in the performance of this activity involving the interpretation !Jf utterances is 
not  to  simply  supplement semantic  meaning;  the  context is  the  base  on  which  all 
communicative activity depends.  That is, rather than saying that the context constrains the 
interpretation of the linguistic form, I argue that it is the linguistic form that constrains the 
context (that is, constrains the creation of the context of interpretation). 
To take one example of what I mean by looking at grammar in a different way, we can 
look at Ekkard König's (1995) excellent study of the meaning of converb constructions. 
This paper focuses on how the converb constructions are vague and so need to be enriched 
by contextual  factors.  That is,  König takes the form  of the converb construction as 
something basic  and then  tries  to see how  contextual factors  help us  to interpret the 
meaning of the converb construction.  He says that general background assumptions and 
contextual  information  and  general  principles  of language  use  'make an  important 
contribution to an interpretive enrichment of the nonspecific basic meaning of converbs.' 
(p.  83).  An  alternative possibility is to  look at  the utterance and try to interpret the 
speaker's communicative intention, and see how the use of a particular structure, such as a 
•  For arguments against the modular view of pragmatics, see Wilson aod Sperber (1986). 
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b construction  constrains our search for the proper interpretation of the speaker's  conver  ,  . 
.  .  that is  how the use of a particular grammatical form constrams our search  llltentlOn,  ,  .  . 
h  general  background  assumptions  and  contextual  mformatlOn  and  general 
throug  .  .  th  'll 
principles of language use in order to help us  creat~ the context of l.nterpretauon  ~t WI 
lead to the intended interpretation.  Rather than taking the gr~tical  form as basIC. and 
trying to interpret its meaning in different context~, we should s~  mference as the basIS  ~f 
.  t'  d try to determine how a particular grarnmatical form develops to rud  commumca IOn,  an 
the hearer in constructing the proper context in which the ostensive act achie~es relevance. 
The  view of grammar I  am  presenting here  means  not trying to defme  what,  for 
le  a 'sub.iect' is  the way Keenan (1976) did, assuming it is some sort of 'thing', but  examp,  J  '  •  • 
seeing what  we  call  'subject' in English  as  a set of constraints on the  mterp~eta~lOn 
(identification) of referents in certain syntactic constructions such as cIause coord~na~on, 
t  and seeing which constraints individuallanguages have or have not grarnmatlcallsed  e c.,  .  10 
art of their grammatical system (see Van Valm and LaPolla 1997, eh.  6).  It also 
:e~ns not inventing covert movements and structures to try to explain all differences of 
interpretation as differences in syntactic structure. 
One consequence of this view is that there is no difference in quality or type between 
lexicalisation and grammaticalisation.  Both are processes of conventionalisation, and 
differ only in the generalness of application.  That is, lexicalisation affects only a single 
specific item (whether long or short), whereas grarnmaticaIisation applies more  ge~erally 
to a class of items.  This forms something more like a continuum, rather than discrete 
categories.  This view also implies that much of language use involves recall of complete 
forms, incIuding sentences, from memory rather than pure generation of totally new forms, 
as  these remembered forms  are  what become  fixed  syntactic  patterns  (constructional 
schemata).  As with so many other things, Bolinger (1961, 1976; see also Pawley 1985, 
Grace 1987) was ahead of his time when he argued for something like schemata, what he 
10  In earlier papers (LaPolla 1990,  1993, 1996) I have compared patterns of syntactic behavior in  Ch~nese 
with those in accusative, ergative, active, and Philippine type languages, and have shown that ChIDcse 
does not pattern like any of those systems.  I have argued this is because Chinese has  n~t grarnrnaticali.zed 
a syntactic pivot for any of its  constructions.  Chinese therefore should not be  conSld~red accus~ti~e, 
ergative, active, or of the Philippine type, but is it another type, possibly called a 'neutral  type, or IS  It a 
non-type? Given the facts mentioned above, and others of a sirnilar nature, the  ~endency.has ~en  to see 
Chinese as another syntactic type, to try to rnake a syntactic relation out of toplC or toPIC  Cham (Huang 
1989, Shi  1989, Her 1991), or to see 'topic prominence'  as  a syntactic type  in opposition to  'subject 
prominence'  (as  many  have  done  based on Li and  Thomspon's  (1976)  original  propos~ of ~ese 
concepts).  I would like to argue instead that a lack of evidence of constraints such ~  we find 10 ~hIDese 
is precisely that, a lack of constraints.  When we say 'type', we mean a set of constralDts of a.certain type, 
and if a type is a set of constraints, then the lack of evidence of constraints in Chine:'e is  eV1den~ of the 
lack of a type, not a separate type.  There are ways  that Chincse has grarnrnaticallzcd  co.nstralO~ th~t 
English has not, such as  numeral classifiers, but in  terms of the constraints  associate~ WI~ subJect lD 
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called 'idioms', and combinations of schemata, what he called 'syntactic blends' to fonn 
new syntactic structures, and attempted to show 'the permeation of the entire grammatical 
structure by threads of idiom' (1961:366).  He argued against a purely generative view of 
grammar, suggesting that our use of grammar was partly creative and partly a matter of 
memory: 
At present we have no way of telling the extent to which a sentence like J wem horne 
is a result of invention, and the extent to which it is a result of repetition, countless 
speakers before us having already said it and transmitted it to us in toto.  Is grammar 
something  where  speakers  'produce'  (Le.  originate)  constructions,  or  where  they 
'reach for'  them, from a preestablished inventory, when the occasion presents itself? 
.,.  Probably grammar is both ofthese things ...  (Bolinger 1961:381). 
As Matisoff (1979[2000):xv) says in talking about the prepattemed, collocational nature 
of language use, 
Entire conversations can be made up of formulaic  expressions so naturaIly  that  the 
interlocutors are not disturbed by their lack of "generative originality"-indeed, quite 
to the contrary:  there is great comfort and security to be derived from fitting into a 
weIl-worn communicative groove.
l1 
The book in which this quote appears is a collection of hundreds of Yiddish psycho-
ostensive expressions, showing just how prepattemed and collocationallanguage use can 
be.  A corollary of this view of language is that there are then no clear lines between 
lexicon, morphology and syntax, as  they form continua of generaIness and rigidity (the 
degree to which they are fixed) (see Bolinger 1976:3; cf.  also Langacker 1987). 
Looking at language this way makes possible explanations not only of why a particular 
type of marking develops, but also of why the use of marking that has already developed 
becomes extended in predictable ways, such as the development of agentive marking from 
ablative marking or the extension of reflexive marking to middle situations (see LaPoIla 
1995b).  The development is in the direction of greater specificity and a more constrained 
set of possible interpretations, utilising resources already present in the language when 
possible. 
This view of language development also has a number of other important implications 
for linguistic theory.  I will mention three here: 
(a)  As languages  differ in terms of constraining interpretation,  both in  terms  of 
constraining or not constraining a particular type of interpretation  (functional 
domain), and also in the degree to which the interpretation is constrained and how it 
is constrained, the differences between languages are  gradient differences, not 
simple parameters. 
11  See also Aijmer (1996) on preset conversational routines. 
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(b)  As  these constraints are the result of grarnmaticalisation, they are therefore not 
genetically hard-wired. 
(c)  (a second order conclusion)  The human  language ability  then  can  not be  an 
autonomous and genetically prograrnmed module; language developm~nt and .use 
must be based on general cognitive structures.  In short, from the pomt of Vlew 
presented in this paper, saying that there are genetically deterrnined parameters !or 
language features, such as  [± configurational), makes no more sense th~n sa~mg 
that  there  are  genetically  determined  parameters  for  other conventlOnahsed 
behaviors, such as [± necktie-wearing). 
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From discourse to grammar in 
Tamang:  topic, focus,  intensifiers 
and subordination 
MARTINE MAZAUDON 
1 Introduction 
Although the general classification of Tibeto-Burman languages remains uncertain, the 
Tamang language of Nepal belongs clearly in the broad group which Robert Shafer (Shafer 
1955)  called the  'Bodish Section' of the  'Bodic division'  of Tibeto-Burman, of which 
Tibetan is the best known member.  The Bodish section consists of two main branches, the 
Bodish Branch, containing classical Tibetan and all the so-called 'Tibetan dialects', which 
share the innovation of bdun for 'seven', and the  'Tamang Branch', earlier named 'Gurung 
Branch' by Shafer on account of the fact that the Gurungs, being soldiers in the British 
army, were the most visible members of this group.  For the earlier scholars, the Tamang 
branch consisted of Tamang (also  called  'Murmi'), Gurung  and Thakali (also  called 
'Thaksya'), to which have been more recently added Manangke, Nar-Phu and the Seke 
dialects (from the group of villages known as Panchgaon, the 'five villages' in Nepal), plus 
Chantyal, which is in a very bad state of repair.  All of these have dialectal variants or sub-
dialects.  All languages of the Tamang Branch share a four-tone tonal system resulting 
from arecent two-way tonal split of what can be reconstructed as an earlier two-tone 
system, not shared by Tibetan in any of its dialects.  If not reconstructible to Proto-Tibeto-
Burman, as  I believe it is not (hut this remains an  open question), this proto two-tone 
system is a common innovation of the Tamang Branch. 
Except for the  northemmost members of the  group,  the Seke and Manang dialects, 
which  underwent some recent Tibetan  influence on  their grammar,  languages of the 
Tamang branch have a very plain verbal morphology, exhibiting none of the developments 
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